Australia’s Deadliest Sniper: He Used a Rifle Made for Kangaroos to Kill 150 at Gallipoli
It weighed 3.96 kilos, just under 4 kilos. Close enough that most men rounded up. But Billy Singh did not round up. Billy Singh knew the weight of this rifle the way you know the weight of your own hand. He could feel the difference between a loaded magazine and one round short. He could feel it in his cheek, in his shoulder, in the way the barrel sat when he rested it across a sandbag for the 900th time on a Tuesday afternoon at the edge of the world.
The short magazine Leenfield number one Mark III chambered in 303 British. Barrel length 635 mm 25.2 in if you spoke the old language. Overall length 1,130 mm tip to butt. 10 round detachable box magazine. Bolt action rear sight graduated to 2,000 yd. Muzzle velocity 744 m/s. That is 2,441 ft pers for the round coming out of the barrel.

174 grain Mark 7 Spitzer bullet. Five groove rifling. Left hand twist. One turn in 10 in. Hold those numbers. Now forget them. Because the rifle that arrived on the Gallipoli Peninsula in May of 1915, slung across the narrow shoulders of Trooper 355 of the fifth Australian Lighor Regiment, was not defined by its factory specifications.
It was defined by what it had done before it ever saw a war. It had killed kangaroos, hundreds of them, maybe thousands, across the dry red plains west of Claremont, Queensland, in heat that cracked the earth open, and in silence so vast you could hear a rue shift its weight to 200 m. This was not a military weapon. Not yet.
This was a tool for pest control, a working instrument carried by a working man across working country. The stock was walnut. The walnut was worn. The oil finish had long since been replaced by the accumulated residue of human sweat, dust, and the kind of handling that comes from a rifle being picked up and set down and picked up again 10,000 times across a decade of daily use.
The checkering on the grip was smooth, and the places where his right hand closed around it, the places where his fingers fell naturally were polished by friction to a dull sheen. The places where his fingers did not fall still held the original texture. Run your hand along that stock. Feel the difference. One side is rough. The other is glass.
That is what 10 years of kangaroo shooting does to Walnut. It personalizes a weapon more precisely than any factory customization. The stock had molded itself to the geometry of one man’s body. The comb sat against his cheek at exactly the height where his eye aligned with the iron sights without adjustment, without shifting, without the tiny muscular corrections that cost a fraction of a second and introduce a fraction of a degree of error.
He did not have to find his sight picture. The sight picture found him. Because the rifle had been shaped over years of daily repetition into an extension of the man who carried it 3.96 kg. The man who carried it weighed 64. His name was William Edward Singh. Billy born the 2nd of March 1886 in Claremont, Queensland.
A small town in the central highlands 270 km in land from the coast. cattle country, mining country, country where the nearest neighbor might be an hour’s ride and the nearest doctor might be a days. His father was John Singh, a driver from Shanghai who had come to Australia during the gold rush years and stayed when the gold ran out.
His mother was Mary Anne Pew, a nurse from Kings Winford in Staferture, England, a Chinese father and an English mother in White Australia Policiera, Queensland. sit with what that meant. The world this boy grew up in. The Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 was the law of the land. Australia had legislated its desire to remain European in composition.
And here was a boy with a Chinese surname and features that marked him immediately as something other than what the policy demanded. He learned to shoot before he learned that the country he was learning to shoot in did not entirely want him. That matters because the marksmanship that would make Billy Singh the deadliest sniper at Gallipoli and one of the deadliest snipers of the entire First World War was not military training.
It was not learned on an army range. It was not taught by an instructor with a manual. It was learned in the red dust and the brown grass and the shimmering heat haze of central Queensland. Putting food on the table and collecting government bounty for pest control, kangaroo shooting. The ruse came in mobs. They were fast. They were alert.
They could detect movement at distances that made a man feel invisible until the mob bolted and he realized they had seen him 3 minutes ago and had simply been waiting to decide whether he was dangerous. Shooting kangaroos taught patience. It taught stillness. It taught the discipline of waiting for the shot rather than forcing it. And it taught economy.
Every round cost money. Every miss was a loss. A kangaroo shooter who wasted ammunition did not stay a kangaroo shooter for long. Lee learned to make every round count because his family’s income depended on it. The rifle taught him that. He became a member of the Proipine Rifle Club. After the family relocated north, he won prizes regularly, consistently against grown men who had been shooting longer and who carried rifles that cost more.
He also played cricket with skill which tells you something about his hand eye coordination and his comfort with pressure. But the cricket is not the story. The rifle is the story. The SMLE that he carried to competitions and carried to the paddock and carried through his days as a stockman and a sugarcane cutter and a timber hauler.
The rifle that became over the course of a decade less a possession and more a partnership. How do you explain the relationship between a shooter and a weapon they have used every day for 10 years? It is not sentimental. It is mechanical, neurological. The act of shouldering the rifle, finding the sight picture, controlling the breath, pressing the trigger.
These actions had been repeated so many times that they had migrated from conscious thought to muscle memory to something deeper than muscle memory, something autonomic. Billy Singh did not think about shooting any more than you think about walking. The rifle was part of his operating system. 3.96 kg stock worn to the shape of his cheek.
Trigger pull known by instinct. On the 24th of October 1914, 2 months after the outbreak of war, Billy Singh enlisted as a trooper in the Australian fifth lighorse regiment of the Australian Imperial Force. He was 28 years old, 5’5 in tall, 64 kg. His medical certificate noted his slight build. It did not note his Chinese heritage, or rather, it noted it, and someone chose to look past it.
The AIF officially restricted enlistment to those of substantially European descent. But Billy was among the first wave of volunteers. And in the rush of early recruitment, a man who could ride and shoot and wanted to fight was not turned away because of who his father was. Not yet. Not in the first wave.
Later, it would become harder, but Billy slipped through. He brought his shooting skills with him. Whether he brought his own rifle to Gallipoli is a matter of historical debate. Some accounts suggest former rifle club members were permitted to bring privately owned weapons. Others state he was issued the standard SMLE Mark III.
What is beyond debate is that the rifle he used on the peninsula, whether his own or military issue performed in his hands in a way that it performed in no one else’s, because what mattered was not the weapon. What mattered was the 10 years of daily practice that preceded it. The rifle was a delivery system. The skill was the weapon, but the rifle was the vessel that carried the skill into the war.
The fifth lighor shipped to Egypt in December of 1914. They trained in the desert. They waited. They chafed. Their horses stayed behind when they went to Calipoli because the peninsula was too steep and too narrow for mounted operations. Light horsemen serving as infantry. Riders without horses, but not without their rifles.
Billy arrived on the Gallipoli Peninsula on the 16th of May 1915, 3 weeks after the initial landings on the 25th of April. He arrived to a situation that was already catastrophic. The landing had been a disaster. The ANZAC forces had come ashore at the wrong beach, scrambled up impossible cliffs, and been pinned into a perimeter barely a thousand m deep by Ottoman defenders who held the high ground.
The trenches were so close in places that you could hear the enemy talking. At Quinn’s post, the lines were less than 30 m apart. 30 m. The distance from one end of a swimming pool to the other. Men were dying from sniper fire constantly, not just at the front line, on the beaches, in the gullies, walking between positions.
Turkish marksmen occupied the ridges and the scrubcovered hillsides. and they fired down into the ANZAC perimeter with the patience of men who knew exactly where their targets would appear. The terrain was made for sniping, rocky, broken, covered in low scrub that offered concealment to anyone who knew how to use it.
The Turkish positions overlooked the Australian lines from multiple angles. A man who raised his head above the parapit for 3 seconds was gambling with his life. A man who moved across open ground was placing a bet he might not collect. The sound of a sniper’s bullet was a constant companion. The crack of the round, the thud of impact, the cry if there was a cry.
Sometimes there was no cry. Sometimes a man just folded and dropped and the men beside him did not immediately understand what had happened because they had not heard the shot that killed him. Into this killing ground came the SMLE. The fifth ligh horse was allocated the area around what would become Chattam’s post, named for a young light horse officer.
This was Billy Singh’s first sniping position. The terrain here offered observation across the Ottoman lines. It also offered something else, something that a kangaroo shooter from central Queensland would have recognized immediately. Broken ground, scattered rocks, low vegetation, heat haze rising off sunbaked earth, lines of sight that change depending on the time of day and the angle of the light.
This was not jungle. This was not forest. This was open semi-arid country with long sight lines and limited cover. It was in its fundamental character not unlike the country west of Claremont where Billy had spent a decade learning to see things that did not want to be seen. He began his work. He spends all day and every day in a sniping position with a telescope and rifle, wrote his commanding officer.
And if they show their heads at all, he has them. Billy’s method was deceptively simple. He rose before dawn in the dark. He moved to his sniping position, a hide constructed from sandbags and stones, and whatever scrub he could weave into the gaps for concealment. He settled the rifle across the firing rest. He waited.
Beside him sat his spotter, a man with a telescope whose job was to scan the Ottoman trenches for targets and to confirm kills. Billy’s first spotter was a trooper named Ion Idrris. Remember that name? Idris would survive the war and become one of Australia’s most famous authors. And he would write about Billy Singh with the authority of a man who had sat beside him, close enough to touch.
In the most intimate and lethal partnership, the Gallipoly campaign produced. Idris described Billy as a little chap, very dark with a jet black mustache and goaty beard, a picturesque looking man killer. That last word sat in the sentence without apology. The routine was always the same. Position occupied before first light, telescope scanning, rifle ready, waiting.
The Turks were cautious. They had learned within weeks of the landings that carelessness was fatal. They built loopholes in their parapets, narrow gaps through which they could observe and fire without exposing themselves. They moved quickly across open sections of trench. They kept their heads down, but they were human, and humans make mistakes.
A head rises for one second too long. A hand appears to adjust a sandbag. A man stands to stretch after hours of cramped immobility. And for 2 seconds, perhaps three, he is visible above the trench line. 3.96 kg. 635 mm of barrel. 174 grains of lead and copper traveling at 744 m/s. 2 seconds was enough. Billy fired through loopholes into loopholes.
He learned to read the pattern of movement in the Turkish trenches the way he had learned to read the behavior of kangaroo mobs on the planes. Where they gathered, where they moved, where they paused, which routes they used at which times of day. He cataloged the positions of enemy snipers by observing the angle of incoming fire and working backward to the origin point.
He built a mental map of the opposing trench line that was more detailed than any officer’s reconnaissance report. The kills mounted one a day, then two, then three, then on exceptional days as many as nine. Each kill was verified. This was not guesswork. This was not estimation. Idris, or later, Tom Shehan watched through the telescope as Billy fired.
They saw the strike. They saw the target fall. They noted it. The number grew. It grew and it grew. And it was passed along the trench lines mouth to mouth like a cricket score which was exactly the right analogy for an army of Australians who understood cricket the way they understood breathing. How many today? Sing got four. Four.
Yesterday was five. He’s slowing down. The humor was dark. The respect was absolute. Idris watched through his telescope one afternoon as Billy worked a section of Turkish trench. A head appeared. Billy fired. The head disappeared. Another appeared 30 m along, peering to see what had happened to the first man. Billy worked the bolt.
The second head disappeared. A third man rose. This one carrying a stretcher pole trying to recover the wounded, and Billy did not fire. He let the stretcher bearer work. Then the stretcher bearer left, and a fourth man appeared, this one with a rifle, scanning for the source of fire. Billy worked the bolt.
The fourth head disappeared. Three rounds, three confirmed kills, one stretcher bearer spared. In less than a minute, he’s got the eyes of a hawk and the patience of a cat watching a mouse hole. Idris wrote, “The metaphor was exact. The cat and the mouse hole, the sniper and the loophole, the kangaroo shooter and the ridge line.
The principle was the same across all three landscapes. Wait, watch. Do not move until the target commits to a mistake. And when the target commits, do not miss because the target will not commit again. Feel the weight of this rifle. 3.96 kg resting across a sandbag in the June sun. The metal was hot, not warm. Hot.
The barrel, after sustained firing, reached temperatures that would raise a blister on bare skin. The bolt handle, exposed to direct sunlight for hours, was too hot to touch without the cloth Billy kept wrapped around his right hand. The stock absorbed the heat more slowly, but held it longer. By mid-afternoon, the entire weapon radiated warmth like a stone pulled from a fire, and Billy held it, cheek against the stock, hands on the grip and the forestock hour after hour in temperatures that climbed past 40° and stayed there. The men in the trenches
around him were enduring the same heat, but they could move. They could shift position. They could lean against the trench wall and flex their hands and roll their shoulders. A sniper could not. Movement was detection. Detection was death. Billy held still. Absolutely still. For hours at a stretch.
The only parts of his body that moved were his eyes. And when the moment came, his right index finger. 119 confirmed kills by early September of 1915. That number was officially recorded by Brigadier General Granville Ryrie, commanding officer of the second Australian Lighor Brigade. We 119 verified, observed, documented kills in approximately 3 months of sniping.
The real number was higher, much higher, because those 119 were only the kills observed by a spotter through a telescope. They did not include the shots fired when no spotter was present. They did not include the targets that were hit, but could not be confirmed as killed rather than wounded. Major Steven Mijley, who served alongside Billy, estimated the true number at closer to 300.
300 men, one rifle, 174 grains at a time. The Turks knew he was there. They could not find him. They knew his approximate sector. The pattern of kills clustered around Chattam’s post made that obvious, but they could not locate his exact position. Billy moved, not every day, but regularly enough that the Ottoman snipers searching for him could never fix his location.
He built multiple hides. He used the terrain the way he had used the terrain in Queensland, not as a fixed position, but as a menu of options. Today this rock, tomorrow that gully. The day after back to the first position, but from a different angle. Unpredictable, patient, invisible. The Turkish command sent for a specialist.
He arrived sometime in late summer of 1915. The Australians called him Abdul the Terrible. His real name has been lost to history. What has not been lost is his reputation. He was a decorated marksman. He had been recognized by the Sultan for his shooting. He was sent specifically to kill Billy Singh. This was not a general counter sniper deployment.
This was a targeted assassination mission. Find the Australian, kill him, end the bleeding. Abdul worked methodically. He examined the positions where Turkish soldiers had been killed. He studied the angles. He calculated the likely firing positions based on the trajectory of incoming rounds.
He was, by all accounts, an excellent sniper in his own right. He understood concealment and patience and the geometry of longrange shooting. He had the skills to find Billy, and Billy knew someone was looking, the cat watching the mouse hole. But now there were two cats. The duel unfolded over days, perhaps weeks.
The sources are not precise on the timeline because the men involved did not keep detailed calendars. They kept detailed kill counts. What is known is that Abdul got close, very close. In August of 1915, a single round fired from the Turkish side found Billy’s position. The bullet passed through Tom Shehan’s spotting telescope, through his hands, through his mouth and cheek, and then into Billy’s shoulder. Follow that sequence.
One bullet, two men. The round entered the telescope. a tube perhaps 4 cm in diameter and exited through the body of the man holding it before striking the man beside him. The Turk who fired that shot was shooting at a target he could barely see through a gap in concealment that measured centime and he placed his round with enough precision to hit the telescope itself. That was not luck.
That was a worldclass marksman operating at the peak of his craft. Shien was severely wounded. His face and hands were torn. He was evacuated from Gallipoli and shipped back to Australia. His war was over. Billy’s shoulder wound was painful, but not crippling. He was back in his sniping position within a week.
One week, a bullet in the shoulder, and he was back on the line in 7 days. The rifle was undamaged, 3.96 kilos, stock against cheek, trigger pull known by instinct. Everything the same, except now the hunter knew he was being hunted. What happened next between Billy and Abdul is recounted differently by different sources.
The core story is consistent. Billy identified Abdul’s position. He found him the way he had found every target by watching, waiting, reading the terrain, and noticing the thing that did not belong. A shadow that moved when the wind was still. A color that did not match the rock behind it. The faintest glint of light on glass or steel.
The mistake that a man makes when he thinks he is hidden, but has forgotten that there is someone on the other side who knows exactly what to look for because he has been making himself invisible on this same ground for months. Billy found him. Billy killed him. The Turkish response was immediate and furious. Ottoman artillery.
Not rifles, not snipers, but artillery opened fire on Billy’s position. They obliterated it. Sandbags, rocks, scrub, everything reduced to rubble and dust. But Billy was not there. He had fired and moved. The oldest rule in sniping. The rule he had never been taught because no one had needed to teach him. Shoot and move. Because the animal you just shot at has friends, and the friends know where the sound came from.
Abdul the Terrible was dead. The rifle that killed him weighed 3.96 kg and fired a 174 grain bullet at 744 m/s, and it had been designed to arm the infantry of the British Empire, but it had been educated in the kangaroo paddocks of central Queensland. The number kept climbing. By the 23rd of October 1915, General William Birdwood, commander of the entire Australian and New Zealand Army Corps, issued an official order complimenting Billy Singh on accounting for 201 enemy kills. 21.
The general was obviously willing to credit a higher number than the regimental records, which sat at 150. Confirmed. An entry from the ANZAC war diary captured the mood with understated precision. Our premier sniper, Trooper Singh, yesterday accounted for his 199th Turk. Everyone of this record is vouched for by an independent observer, frequently an officer who observes through a telescope.
Everyone vouched for by an independent observer. The body count was verified in real time by trained military observers using telescopic equipment. 150 confirmed at the conservative end, 200 and one by Birdwood’s assessment, close to 300 by Mitchley’s estimate. And the rifle, the SMLE Mark III, the 3.96 kg bolt-action pest control tool from central Queensland, had done it all with iron sights.
Most modern audiences assume that a sniper of Billy Singh’s caliber must have used a telescopic sight. Some accounts suggest he did. There is evidence that some former rifle club members at Gallipoli used weapons fitted with target sights, including the Lotty optical sight. At the most consistent accounts described Billy using the standard SMLE with its factory iron sights, the blade front sight and the notch rear sight graduated to 2,000 yd.
These were the sights he had used for a decade in Queensland. These were the sights through which he had learned to read distance and windage and the subtle distortions of heat mirage. These were the sights that had become through 10 years of repetition as transparent as a window. He did not look through them. He looked past them.
The sight picture was automatic, instinctive, a product of neurological conditioning so deep that the conscious mind was not involved. The effective engagement range on Galipoli was rarely more than 3 to 400 m, often much less. The trenches at Quinn’s post were 30 m apart. At Chattam’s Post, the distances were greater, perhaps 200 to 400 m across the broken ground to the Turkish positions.
At these ranges, in the hands of a man who had spent a decade shooting kangaroos at similar distances across similar terrain, iron sights were not a limitation. They were a preference because a telescopic sight narrows your field of vision. It forces you to look at one point. Iron sights allow peripheral awareness.
They let you see the target and the ground around the target simultaneously. For a man who was hunting other hunters, men who moved and hid and shot back. Peripheral awareness was not a luxury. It was survival. What does it sound like when an SMLE fires? It is not the sharp crack of a modern rifle.
It is deeper, fuller, a bark rather than a snap. The 303 British cartridge pushes a heavy bullet at moderate velocity. Fast enough to be supersonic, slow enough that the report carries a weight and a body that thinner, faster rounds do not possess. At the firing end, the recoil is substantial but manageable. A firm push into the shoulder rather than a violent kick.
The bolt throw is short and smooth. One of the smoothest bolt actions ever designed, the Lee Enfield’s rear locking bolt, which critics said was less rigid than the Mouser’s front locking design, produced a trade-off. Marginally less theoretical accuracy at extreme range, in exchange for a cycling speed that no other bolt rifle could match.
A trained shooter could fire 15 aimed rounds per minute, the mad minute, the British called it. German troops at Mons in 1914 believed they were under machine gun fire. Billy did not fire 15 rounds a minute. He fired one round, then he waited, then he fired another. Sometimes 5 minutes between shots, sometimes 20, sometimes an hour. Each round was a decision.
Each trigger press was a commitment. Each 174 grain bullet was a conversation between the rifle and the target that lasted less than a second. and could not be taken back. The smell of the rifle after a day of sniping, cordite, gun oil, hot metal, and sweat. The sweat from his hands and his cheek and his forearms where they pressed against the stock.
The same organic smell that had been soaking into the walnut for a decade. The wood held it, absorbed it, became it. You could have blindfolded a man and put six SMLES in front of him and if he knew Billy Singh’s rifle, he could have found it by smell alone. By late October, Billy was exhausted.
Not from the shooting, from the conditions. Gallipoli was destroying men through disease faster than through enemy fire, dysentery, influenza, rheumatism. The water was contaminated. The food was inadequate. The flies were a biblical plague that coated every surface and every wound and every piece of food that was not sealed in a tin.
Billy had already been hospitalized briefly with influenza in August. His shoulder wound from Abdul’s bullet had healed, but the fatigue was cumulative. The peninsula was eating him alive the way it was eating everyone alive. Birdwood himself had joined Billy as a spotter on at least one occasion, witnessing firsthand the skill that he had heard described in reports.
Lord Kitner was told that if all the Allied forces could match the capacity of the Queensland sniper, they would be in Constantinople within the month. They could not, and they were not. The evacuation of Gallipoli began in December of 1915. The withdrawal was paradoxically the most successful operation of the entire campaign.
Tens of thousands of men evacuated from multiple beaches without a single casualty. The rifles were among the last things to leave. Some were rigged with ingenious devices, water drip mechanisms that would fire around hours after the men had gone, simulating continued occupation of the trenches. The Turks did not realize the ANZACs had left until they found the positions empty.
Billy Singh left Gallipoli with his reputation and his rifle and a number that the world was beginning to learn. 150 confirmed, 20 by Birdwood’s count, 300 by Miji’s estimate. The Turks had their own numbers and their own accounts and their own reference to the sniper they could not locate and could not silence.
The international press had picked up the story. London and American newspapers reported on the Queensland marksman who was bleeding the Ottoman Empire one round at a time. The distinguished conduct medal came in March of 1916, second only to the Victoria Cross. The citation read, “For conspicuous gallantry from May to September 1915 at Anzac as a sniper.
His courage and skill were most marked and he was responsible for a very large number of casualties among the enemy. No risk being too great for him to take. No risk being too great for him to take from the official record of the British Empire. But Gallipoli was only the beginning of Billy’s war.
He transferred to the 31st Battalion and went to France for the Western Front. He served at Polygon Wood in Belgium in 1917 where he was recommended for but not awarded the Military Medal for leading an anti-niper fighting patrol. He was mentioned in dispatches again by General Birdwood. He was awarded the Belgian Cuadigar.
He was wounded again, more seriously this time and was gassed. The Western front was a different war from Gallipoli. The distances were greater. The artillery was heavier. The role of the individual sniper was diminished by the industrial scale of the killing. Billy’s particular genius, the close-range, intimate, personal precision that had made him lethal at Gallipoli, was less suited to the mechanized slaughter of France and Belgium. The rifle went with him.
The same 3.96 kg, the same worn stock, the same trigger pull way. But the war around the rifle had changed, and the rifle could not change with it. Billy returned to Australia in July of 1918 aboard the troop ship SS Buuna. serving as a submarine guard during the voyage. His marksmanship still in demand even on the journey home.
He was permanently discharged as unfit for service due to ongoing chest problems likely a consequence of the gas exposure. He arrived in Proupine, Queensland to a hero’s welcome, a procession, a band, speeches at the town hall, a purse of sovereigns from well-wishers. He had married a Scottish woman named Elizabeth in Edinburgh in June of 1917.
She may or may not have followed him to Australia. The historical record is contradictory. What is not contradictory is what happened next. Nothing. Billy Singh, the deadliest sniper at Gallipoli, the man whose rifle had killed more Ottoman soldiers than some entire platoon, returned to civilian life and found that civilian life had no particular use for a man whose greatest skill was putting bullets into targets at 300 m.
He went back to Claremont. He worked a mining claim on the missile gold field. The gold was sparse. The money was worse. His marriage disintegrated. Elizabeth, if she had come to Australia at all, vanished from the record within a few years. The transition from Edinburgh’s green hills to the dust and heat of a central Queensland mining district would have been brutal for a woman who had not grown up in it. The years passed.
The fame faded. The man who had been known to an army and a nation became a man known to a shrinking circle of old soldiers and neighbors. He tried sheep farming. He tried other mining claims. Nothing held. The skills that had made him extraordinary in war, patience, precision, the ability to remain motionless for hours, the capacity to kill without hesitation, were not skills that the peacetime economy valued or rewarded.
In 1942, with another war consuming the world, Billy left Claremont for Brisbane. He told his sister Beatatrice that it might be cheaper to live in the city. He took a laboring job. He was 56 years old. His chest still troubled him. His body carried the accumulated damage of gas wounds and 30 years of hard living in the Queensland outback.
On the 19th of May 1943, William Edward Singh died alone in his room at a boarding house at 304 Montigue Road, South Brisbane. He was 57 years old. The cause of death was a ruptured aorta. His significant possessions at the time of his death consisted of a hut on a mining claim valued at approximately 20 and the sum of five shillings. Five shillings.
The man who had been worth more to the ANZAC campaign than a battery of artillery owned five shillings when he died. His war medals were gone, lost, sold, or given away at some point during the decades of decline. His rifle, the 3.96 kg of walnut and steel that had changed the dynamics of the Gallipoli sniping war, was not among his possessions.
Its specific fate is unrecorded. It may have been returned to military stores after his discharge. It may have been sold or traded. It may be sitting in a private collection somewhere unrecognized. Its history invisible to anyone who does not know what the wear pattern on the stock means or why the checkering on the grip is smooth on one side and rough on the other.
It may have been destroyed, scrapped, melted down. 3.96 kg of metal and wood returned to raw material. The story carried erased or it may be sitting in a museum. There is a photograph in the Australian War Memorial Collection catalog number C429 showing Billy Singh at his sniping post in August of 1915. The rifle is there laid across the sandbag, the barrel pointing toward the Turkish lines.
The stock pressed against the earth, the wear on the grip is invisible now, the sweat and gun oil and gun oil. You cannot feel the heat of the metal or the smoothness of the walnut where his cheek had rested 10,000 times, but you know it is there because you have been told. In 1995, a statue of Billy Singh was unveiled in Claremont.
It shows him in a sniping pose. In 2004, an Australian army sniper team operating in Baghdad named their position the Billy Singh Bar and Grill. In 2009, the Chinese consil general laid wreaths at Billy’s grave in Lutichi Cemetery in Brisbane. Each year on the weekend before Anzac Day, the William Billy Singh memorial shooting competition is held on the Sunshine Coast using Lee Enfield service rifles.
The trophy goes to the highest scorer, Lee Enfield service rifles. The same platform, the same boltaction, the same 303 British cartridge, the same design that Billy carried from the kangaroo paddocks of Claremont to the ridges of Gallipoli. The rifle did not look like a weapon that shaped a campaign.
That is the point. It looked like what it was, a standard issue infantry arm designed for mass production and general service. It was not customized. It was not exotic. It was not fitted with advanced optics or precision modifications. It was a tool, a working tool carried by a working man adapted through years of use to the specific geometry of one body and the specific habits of one mind.
Its power was not in its specifications. Its power was in the 10 years of daily practice that preceded the war and the cold, patient, relentless discipline that defined its use during the war. 150 confirmed kills, perhaps 300 in total, with a rifle made for kangaroos. Billy Singh was born to a Chinese father and an English mother in a country that was not sure it wanted either of them.
He grew up shooting pests in the dust. He went to a war that no one was prepared for, and he brought the only tool he trusted. He sat in the heat and the flies and the stench of Gallipoli for months and he killed men one at a time with the patience of a man who had learned that patience was not a virtue but a technique. He came home.
He was celebrated. He was forgotten. He died with five shillings and no medals and no rifle. 3.96 kg. The stock was walnut. The walnut was worn. One side rough. One side glass. If you ever find it, you will know it by the
