The Yanks Requested British Support. The SAS Were Already Inside the Building When It Was Filed

Now, let’s get into it. The machinery of formal military requests is designed to ensure accountability and deliberation in how military forces operate in coalition contexts. When one military command needs support from another, especially support from another nation’s military, there are procedures designed by both nations to manage the complexity of intermilitary cooperation.

 The request has to be formal. It has to specify exactly what is being asked for. It has to go through approval chains in both the requesting command and the supporting command. It has to be documented so that there is a record of what was requested and what was approved. This creates a record. It creates accountability.

 It creates clarity about authority and authorization. The formal request process is in many ways a very American invention, a systematic documented approach to decision-making that creates a paper trail, establishes who approved what and when, and ensures that every decision has been vetted through appropriate channels.

 According to those who have worked in military organizations and in coalition command structures, it also creates significant delay between the time something is recognized as necessary and the time resources are actually allocated and deployed. The machinery is designed for a different operational tempo than counterinsurgency in urban environments requires in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Sources describe this delay became a chronic problem that fundamentally affected the tempo of counterinsurgency operations. American commanders operating under conventional military structures found themselves with time-sensitive intelligence that required rapid action. They needed support, additional troops, intelligence gathering, helicopter assets, special forces raiders to conduct direct action against high value targets.

 They would submit a formal request. That request would travel up their chain of command, documented and filed. It would be routed to the appropriate inter agency office that had oversight of the particular type of support being requested. It would be reviewed for compliance with rules of engagement, military law, established policy guidance.

 It would be coordinated with allied commands whose cooperation was necessary for execution. Legal officers would review it. Commanders would review it. Sometimes it would be sent back for clarification or additional information. The request would sit in cues waiting for decisions. Holidays would slow the process. Personnel changes in command would require the new commander to review pending requests.

 Coordination meetings would be scheduled and rescheduled. Weeks later, sometimes months, the answer would come back. The entire process from initial submission to final approval could consume 30 days or more. three to four weeks of the intelligence being active and relevant, then additional time for execution. By that time, according to accounts from those who worked the problem, the intelligence was stale. The opportunity had passed.

The target had moved. The situation had evolved. What had seemed urgent 3 weeks ago was no longer relevant. A high-value target who was in a specific location when the request was filed would have relocated. Intelligence sources would have dried up. the tactical window would have closed and then when the approval finally came back, it would approve action that was no longer possible.

 The SAS, operating under a different command structure and a different cultural framework, worked on a fundamentally different timeline. According to accounts from British officers and American commanders who worked with the SAS, the regiment operated on what might be described as a culture of autonomous action and rapid decision-making.

 A situation would present itself. intelligence would come in about a high value target, about an opportunity, about a threat that needed to be addressed. SAS commanders, based on their understanding of the broader campaign and the nature of counterinsurgency warfare, would assess whether action was warranted.

 If action seemed warranted based on their assessment, they would not wait for approval from higher headquarters. They would not submit a formal request and wait for that request to be processed. They would move. This was not recklessness driven by impatience or a desire to operate without constraints. It was deliberate operational philosophy based on training, judgment, and a command structure that explicitly trusted senior operators to make decisions about whether action was necessary.

 The SAS operated under a broader mandate from their own command authority, something like conduct counterinsurgency operations against high-v value targets in Iraq. And within that mandate, they exercise judgment. A squadron commander had the authority to determine whether a particular target met the threshold of high value and whether conducting an operation against that target was consistent with the broader mandate.

 The commander did not need to ask permission. The commander had already been granted permission in principle to conduct operations like the one being contemplated. The question was whether this specific instance fell within that granted authority. For the SAS, that was a decision a competent commander could make without consulting higher headquarters.

 According to military analysts examining the difference, this reflected fundamentally different assumptions about command authority and trust in military organizations. American military culture, shaped by large-scale operations during the Cold War and concerns about accountability in the modern era, assumes that significant decisions need to flow through chains of command and require explicit approval from higher authority before action is taken.

 The larger the operation, the more important it is to have approval documented and recorded. British military culture shaped by centuries of colonial operations and by more recent experiences in smaller scale warfare in places like Northern Ireland and the Balkans assumes that experienced commanders at lower levels have the authority and the responsibility to assess situations and make decisions.

Waiting for approval from distant higher headquarters would slow operations to a pace that insurgencies could exploit. Both approaches have genuine merits and genuine costs. The American approach creates accountability and clarity about who is responsible for decisions. The British approach creates agility and the ability to respond at the pace required by the operational environment.

 What this meant operationally according to accounts from those who worked in both systems was that the SAS sometimes acted while the Americans were still deciding whether to ask them to act. An American commander would notice intelligence about a high value target in a particular location. He would recognize that the target was significant, perhaps an al-Qaeda leader, perhaps a senior insurgent figure, but also that the location was complex, perhaps civilians might be present, perhaps the terrain was difficult, perhaps the risk was

high. He would understand that he needed support to conduct an operation against the target safely and effectively. He would submit a formal request for SAS assistance. The request would specify the target by name and background, the location and geographic detail, the support being requested, reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, direct action, the desired timeline.

 The request would be written and documented. It would go through approvals at multiple levels of the American chain of command. Lawyers would review it. The rules of engagement officer would review it. Specialists in civil affairs might be consulted. The request would wait for the right meeting where it could be discussed and briefed to decision makers.

 Days would pass in this preliminary review process alone. Meanwhile, the SAS commander in theater receiving intelligence through the same channels or through liaison channels would have already assessed the situation. The target would be significant in the broader network. The location would be knowable through available intelligence.

 The SAS would have the capability to act against the target. The SAS commander, according to accounts from those involved, would assess that the decision to act or not act was within his authority. He would recognize the significance of the target and assess that action was warranted. He would not wait for a formal request from American forces. He would move.

 This decision might be made in an informal conversation with his superior officer, a brief discussion of the intelligence, an assessment of the target’s significance, a confirmation that the operation was within the scope of the existing mandate. The superior would say something like, “Sounds good. Proceed.” That would be the extent of the approval process. Plans would be drawn up.

 The team would be briefed. By the time the American formal request was being processed through the American chain of command, the SAS team was already being briefed and readying for operations. By the time American approvals were coming through, the SAS was already inside the building conducting the operation, accomplishing objectives that the American commander had not yet formally requested.

 This created an unusual and from the American perspective, sometimes frustrating situation, according to those who experienced it. The American command structure was seeking permission to ask the British to do something that the British had already done. The formal request, when it finally came back approved after weeks of processing, was approving an action that had already occurred.

 The American commander, when notified that the request was approved, would then be notified by liaison channels that the operation was already complete. The result was technically successful, the target had been dealt with, but organizationally awkward. The formal request process and the actual operations had become completely desynchronized.

 The Americans had been going through their procedures while the British had been accomplishing the mission. From an American officer’s perspective, there was something deeply wrong with this arrangement. He had responsibility for his area of operations. He was accountable to his command for what happened there. Yet, he was not in control of operations being conducted by the British forces in his area.

 When asked by his higher command, “What happened in your sector last night?” he would sometimes have to say, “I don’t know yet. I’ll have to ask the British liaison.” This was not how American military hierarchy was supposed to function. Responsibility and authority were supposed to align. But in this case, the British had the authority to conduct operations while the American commander had responsibility for the sector.

 The disconnect was fundamental. Sources described this happening repeatedly in Iraq, particularly between 2004 and 2007 during the period of intensive counterinsurgency operations. An American unit would make a discovery about an insurgent network through their intelligence sources or through investigation of an attack.

 Intelligence would suggest a particular target for action. The American unit would begin the process of formally requesting support to conduct an operation against that individual. Meanwhile, the SAS with their own intelligence channels and their own assessment of threat and opportunity would have already begun planning against the same target through their intelligence networks.

 They would conduct the operation within days. By the time the American formal request was approved by multiple levels of American command, the target had been dealt with. The approval had become moot. The request that was being filed was an approval for an operation that had already been completed. According to those who worked in coalition command structures, this created a strange kind of friction that was never fully resolved.

 American commanders wanted to be part of decision-making about what happened in their area of responsibility. They had responsibility for security in their area and they wanted to know that actions were being taken with their knowledge and consent. The formal request system was explicitly designed to ensure this kind of coordination.

 But the SAS was operating on a different principle. They believed that their area of responsibility was Iraq generally or at least the parts of Iraq where significant threats existed. They believed that their task was to act against significant threats to the broader counterinsurgency mission and that they did not need specific approval from American commanders for each action.

 They operated under a broader mandate from their own command and within that mandate they exercised independent judgment about what needed to happen to the SAS. The American insistence on formal approval for each operation was precisely the kind of overhead that made counterinsurgency slow and ineffective. The British view was that you gave experienced commanders a clear mission counterinsurgency in Iraq and you let them conduct that mission.

 You did not require them to get permission for each tactical decision. You did not ask them to wait for approval from civilian leadership before each operation. You trusted them to make good decisions. From the SAS perspective, the formal request system was treating special forces operators like conventional military units that needed centralized control.

 Special forces in the SAS view should not need that level of oversight. The tension was not about fundamental conflict between units or national rivalries. The American and SAS commanders were by most accounts cooperating effectively and professionally. The tension was fundamentally about authority structures and accountability structures in military organizations.

 According to military historians examining the period, the question was foundational to the two militaries. Who decided what happened and when? The American system assumed that decisions about significant military action needed to flow through chains of command and be made at higher levels with approval from appropriate authority and that this created accountability.

 The British system assumed that experienced commanders could and should make decisions at lower levels without waiting for distant approval and that this created responsiveness and effectiveness. These two approaches being asked to work together in the same theater created inherent friction. Neither system was wrong.

 Both reflected genuine principles about how military should function, but they were intention. What the formal request process was designed to prevent was exactly what the SAS approach enabled. lower level commanders making significant decisions about military action without explicit higher approval. The American system, particularly after the war on terror began in 2001 and special operations became more central to American military strategy, developed procedures specifically designed to maintain tight control over special operations. Higher commanders wanted to

know about all significant special operations being conducted. They wanted to ensure consistency with overall strategy. They wanted to ensure that rules of engagement were being followed and that legal review had been completed. They wanted accountability and documentation. The system reflected a fundamental belief that in modern military organizations, particularly when dealing with sensitive operations that could have political consequences, decisions needed to be made at high levels with appropriate review and

approval. The SAS approach was, according to those familiar with it, based on different assumptions. Special forces commanders were selected and trained to be able to assess complicated situations and make judgment calls. Requiring every action to go through approval chains would slow forces down, would reduce their responsiveness, would undercut their advantage.

 The SAS did not distrust their higher command. They simply believed that trust should mean allowing experienced commanders to exercise judgment. According to accounts from British military officers, this was not unique to Iraq. The SAS had operated this way in Northern Ireland, in the Balkans, in other theaters.

 They were accustomed to autonomy. They were accustomed to making judgments about what needed to happen and taking action on those judgments. This was how the regiment had been built. It was part of its culture. It was part of what made it effective. The gap between the two approaches created documented cases where the formal and the actual were completely misaligned.

 According to accounts from those who worked in joint operations, there were situations where American units formally requested specific types of support and the SAS had already provided that support or decided that different support was more appropriate. The Americans would receive the formal approval and only then learn that the operation had already been conducted or that it had been conducted differently than requested.

 One area where this became particularly acute was in human intelligence gathering and collection management. American commanders would formally request human intelligence collection on specific targets or areas. The request would specify what information was needed, the timeline in which it was needed, and the level of detail required.

 The SAS with their own intelligence sources that had been developed over months or years of operations in Iraq and with their own assessment of what was needed to fight the counterinsurgency effectively would often be conducting the same intelligence gathering already. Or they would be gathering different intelligence that they assessed as more immediately valuable to the broader campaign.

 When the formal American request came through after weeks of processing, it would sometimes find that the British had already gathered the intelligence through different means. The information the formal request was seeking had already been collected and acted upon. The formal request system was chasing information the SAS had already gathered.

 According to military analysts, this actually worked out quite well operationally. The SAS with better local knowledge and more experienced intelligence operators often gathered more useful intelligence than what the American formal request would have generated. But it did mean that the American attempt to manage and coordinate intelligence gathering through formal requests was being circumvented by British operators who were gathering intelligence based on their own judgment about what was needed.

 The phenomenon extended to tactical operations as well. American units would sometimes formally request that specific buildings be surveiled, specific areas be patrolled, specific targets be identified. The SAS would already be conducting some of this work as part of their own assessment of what needed to happen. The formal request system was attempting to coordinate and control operations that were already being conducted under a different command authority and different assumptions about who had the responsibility to make decisions. What

made this sustainable? according to accounts from those who worked in both systems was that the SAS was generally very good at what it was doing. The autonomous operations were producing results. High-V value targets were being identified and dealt with. Intelligence was being gathered. The counterinsurgency was being advanced.

 An American commander might be frustrated that the SAS was not waiting for formal requests, but that commander was also benefiting from the results of SAS operations. The SAS was being effective at a pace that the formal request system would have prevented. According to military historians, this pattern created a subtle dependency on SAS initiative and judgment.

 American commanders began to rely on the SAS to do certain things that the American formal request system could not do quickly enough. They came to expect that when something significant needed to happen in areas where the SAS was operating, the SAS would assess the situation and move if they judged it necessary.

 This expectation began to replace the formal request system as the operative mechanism for how American and British forces coordinated. Instead of submitting formal requests through multiple layers, American commanders would alert the SAS liaison officer to a situation and suggest that it might warrant attention. The American commander had essentially outsourced the decision about whether to act to the SAS commander.

 The SAS would then make its own decision about whether to act based on its own assessment. This worked operationally and it often produced good results. An American commander would tell a SAS liaison, “We have intelligence about a network operating in the eastern part of the city. Al-Qaeda connections, these guys might be significant.

” The liaison would convey this to the SAS commander. The SAS commander would evaluate the intelligence, assess the threat level, and decide whether to act. If the assessment was that the threat was significant and the SAS had the capability, they would move. If not, they would pass. The American commander would find out the result afterward.

 But it was a very different structure from the formal request system that was supposed to govern coalition operations, and it meant that control of operations was in practice more decentralized than the American command structure officially preferred. The gap in timelines was stark and consequential. According to those who worked in both systems, a formal inner service request subject to multiple levels of approval and coordination might take three to six weeks to move through the system, submitted to the requesting command,

reviewed by that command, forwarded to the supporting command, reviewed and coordinated by the supporting command, approved, transmitted back through channels, received and acted on. During that 3 to six week period, the intelligence would be stale almost from the moment the approval finally came back.

 A high-V value target who was at location A when the request was filed might have moved to location B by week 2 and to location C by week 4. When the approval finally arrived, approving the operation against location A, the target was no longer there. The SAS response to the same situation, operating under their own command authority and their own assessment of what needed to happen, might take 6 to 12 hours.

 Receipt of intelligence, assessment of the situation, planning the operation, briefing the team, execution. By the time the formal process had even been completed, the entire tactical situation had changed. The target had moved. The intelligence was stale. The opportunity had passed. The information that made the operation seem necessary was no longer valid or was only partially valid.

 This was not a failure of American planning. It was simply the reality of the time horizons involved. The formal system was designed for situations where decisions could be made over days or weeks. Counterinsurgency in Baghdad operated on hours. The two systems could not be reconciled. One would have to give way to the other. According to accounts from American commanders who worked in this environment, this dynamic fundamentally affected how they approached intelligence gathering and targeting.

They learned not to necessarily expect that formal requests for support would result in actions. 3 weeks later, they learned to work with SAS liaison more directly in informal channels. They learned to alert the SAS to situations rather than formally requesting specific actions. This approach was more effective operationally and it often produced good results, but it was also less controllable from the American perspective.

 An American commander could not direct the SAS to take a specific action. He could only hope that when the SAS assessed a situation, they would come to the same conclusions about what needed to happen. The American commander had to trust that the SAS would make good decisions, which they generally did.

 But there was an inherent loss of control in this system. A commander accustomed to being able to direct subordinate forces to accomplish specific missions, according to accounts, found it frustrating to work with forces that would listen to his intelligence assessment and then decide independently whether to act on it. The American military culture was built on clear command lines and explicit direction.

 You told a subordinate commander what you wanted accomplished, and the subordinate was expected to accomplish it. But the SAS did not operate under American command. They operated under British command authority. They would cooperate with American commanders. They would be responsive to American intelligence, but they would not take direction.

 They would assess situations and decide whether to act. This required a fundamentally different kind of trust and a fundamentally different approach to command and control. The SAS from their perspective, according to accounts, saw American formal request systems as bureaucracy that could be bypassed if commanders simply made good decisions at the tactical level.

 The SAS was not trying to circumvent American authority. They were trying to be effective at counterinsurgency and they believed that effectiveness required rapid response to situations. They operated under the assumption that they had the authority to make these decisions. They operated under British command authority which had delegated counterinsurgency operations to task force black.

 Within that broad delegation, they exercised judgment. This tension between American systems designed to control and coordinate and British systems designed to trust and enable rapid response was never fully resolved. According to those who studied the partnership, the two approaches coexisted. They sometimes complemented each other.

 The American insistence on documentation and formal approval meant that when something went wrong, there was accountability. The SAS autonomy meant that when something needed to happen quickly, it could. The tensions between these approaches were managed more than resolved. According to accounts from military officers who worked in joint command structures, the real problem came when formal American requests moved through the system and came back approved only to learn that the situation had changed.

 An American commander would request support for a specific target. 6 weeks would pass. The approval would come back, but by then the target would have moved. The intelligence would be stale. The situation would be different. The approval when it arrived would be an approval for an operation that was no longer relevant.

 This was not a failure of the SAS. It was a failure of the formal request system. What this dynamic revealed, according to military strategists, was a fundamental challenge in coalition operations. Different nations militaries operate on different command structures, different timing frameworks, different assumptions about authority.

 American command structures were built on the principle of centralized control with decentralized execution. Decisions were supposed to flow through chains, but execution, actually conducting operations, was delegated to lower levels with significant discretion. British command structures were built on the principle of trust in experienced commanders.

Authority was decentralized at multiple levels. Commanders were expected to assess situations and make decisions. When these two approaches tried to work together, according to those who managed the coalition, the result was constant negotiation about who had the authority to make what decisions and when.

 The formal mechanisms, the requests, the approvals, the coordination procedures were designed to impose American logic on the coalition. But the SAS, operating within British command structures that emphasized autonomy and trust, often made decisions that the American formal system was still processing.

 According to accounts from those involved, this was sometimes frustrating for American commanders. They wanted to know what was happening. They wanted to ensure that operations were consistent with overall strategy. They wanted accountability, but they also recognized that the SAS approach was producing results.

 So, they adapted. They learned to work in informal channels. They learned to communicate through liaison officers. They learned to alert the SAS to situations and trust that the regiment would make good decisions. The SAS, for their part, according to accounts from those involved, tried to be responsive to American concerns and to the broader coalition strategy.

 They would inform American commanders of operations when possible, giving notice when operations could be discussed. They would try to avoid taking actions that would undermine overall American strategy or that would conflict with American operations. They would coordinate when they could do so without slowing response times to unacceptable levels, but they would not let the formal request system dictate their operations.

They would not wait for approvals when situations required rapid response and when waiting would mean missing opportunities or allowing threats to escape. This was their professional judgment based on their experience of counterinsurgency. They exercise this judgment based on their assessment of what counterinsurgency required, speed, responsiveness, the ability to act when the target was present, not weeks later when the opportunity had passed.

 One specific example that sources describe involved an al-Qaeda network operating in a particular area of Baghdad. American intelligence had identified the network. An American unit had submitted a formal request for support in targeting the network. The request had gone through the American chain of command and was being coordinated at higher levels.

 Meanwhile, the SAS through their own intelligence sources and their own assessment of the threat had identified the same network as a significant target. The SAS began planning operations against the network. By the time the American formal request had been approved and transmitted, the SAS had already conducted multiple operations against the network and significantly degraded its capabilities.

The American approval, when it arrived, was an approval for action that had already been taken and completed. According to those who worked the intelligence, this was common enough that it became normalized. American units and SAS commanders developed informal understandings. When an American commander wanted SAS support, he would alert a liaison officer rather than submit a formal request.

 The liaison officer would inform the SAS commander. The SAS commander would assess the situation and decide how to respond. This was much faster than the formal system. It was also less documented, which created some concern about accountability, but it was how things actually worked. The formal request system persisted throughout the Iraq war, according to military historians, for multiple reasons.

 It persisted partly because it created legal and documentary records that could be referenced if operations became controversial or if legal questions arose. It persisted partly because it allowed American commanders to maintain the appearance of control even when that control was not fully exercised in practice.

 and it persisted partly because it genuinely was necessary for some types of coordination that required resource allocation and high level authorization. But the actual operations were often conducted through different channels, informal intelligence channels, autonomous assessment by lower level commanders and command decisions made at lower levels without waiting for formal approval.

 The formal system and the actual system coexisted. They operated in parallel. In some cases, they complemented each other. In other cases, they contradicted each other. The fact that this system persisted and worked suggested something important about how military organizations actually function versus how they are officially organized.

 What this revealed, according to military strategists examining the Iraq partnership, was something important about how coalition operations actually work. Coalition operations work despite bureaucratic mismatches, not because of them. They work because experienced commanders learn to communicate in informal ways.

 They work because trust is built between operators through shared danger and shared mission. They work because both sides are committed to the overall mission enough to tolerate each other’s approaches even when those approaches are fundamentally different. But the formal systems, the requests, the approvals, the coordination procedures often trail behind actual operations rather than guiding them.

 The formal systems create a record and maintain the appearance of orderly decision-making, but the actual decisions about what happens operationally are often made through different channels and at different levels than the formal systems document. According to accounts from those who participated in the partnership over multiple years, the challenge was most acute in the transition periods when command changed.

 When a new American commander arrived in Iraq, he would often try to impose American command procedures and oversight mechanisms. He would want formal request systems to be strictly observed. He would want to know about all operations before or immediately after they occurred. He would want to coordinate everything through proper channels.

 The SAS would initially comply more formally with these new expectations. But over weeks and months, as the new commander learned the operational reality of counterinsurgency in Iraq, the informal patterns would reassert themselves. The commander would learn from experience that the formal system was too slow to be useful for operational purposes.

 He would attend an operations briefing and hear about a piece of intelligence about a significant target. He would ask when the operation would be conducted. He would be told, “We already got him 3 days ago.” He would think he was in control of operations in his area, but he would discover that things were happening that he did not know about until after they occurred.

 He would learn to work through informal channels and liaison relationships. He would learn to trust SAS judgment about what needed to happen and when. The formal system would continue to be used for some types of coordination and planning, but the actual tactical decisions would continue through informal channels where they could be made at the speed required by operations.

 By the time the next command change occurred, any new commander would go through the same learning process. The pattern was repetitive because it was driven by fundamental realities about how fast operations needed to move. According to military historians who have studied coalition operations, this was not unique to Iraq.

 Similar patterns have emerged in other coalition operations throughout modern military history. The formal machinery of interallied coordination is designed for different purposes than the actual conduct of operations. It is designed for diplomatic coordination between governments, for legal accountability, for resource management and strategic planning.

 The actual tactical operations by contrast happen faster and through different channels than the formal systems document. The formal systems are designed for strategic level decision-making. The tactical operations are designed around operational necessity. When these two operate on different timelines, the result is the kind of parallel systems that emerged in Iraq.

 A formal system that creates a record and maintains the appearance of control and an informal system that actually conducts operations at the speed required by the tactical situation. What the gap between American request systems and SAS autonomy revealed ultimately was a fundamental truth about military organizations and the nature of modern warfare.

 Warfare often requires rapid response to emerging opportunities and threats. Bureaucracy by its nature is designed to be thorough and deliberate and to ensure accountability through multiple layers of review. The tension between these two imperatives is real and endemic to large military organizations trying to conduct operations at high tempo.

 The SAS, a relatively small unit with a culture of trust in junior leaders, could afford to be responsive and autonomous. American forces, much larger and operating under legal and political constraints that demanded more oversight, needed more formalized systems. When these two approaches collided in Iraq, the result was not the triumph of one system over the other, but rather an adaptation where both systems persisted, but the actual operations often ran on the faster, more autonomous timeline that the SAS operated under. The formal

system continued to exist, but became less determinative of what actually happened operationally. The formal request system was a way for American commanders to maintain the illusion of control to preserve the formal hierarchy and the appearance of deliberate decision-making while actually allowing rapid operations to proceed through informal channels.

 The SAS autonomy was a way for the British to contribute to counterinsurgency at the pace that counterinsurgency required, operating at the speed of threat and opportunity rather than the speed of bureaucratic process. By the time anyone was officially filing a formal request and sending it through channels, the SAS were already doing what needed to be done.

 This was not always comfortable for the American command structure, particularly for commanders who believed in formal procedures and accountability, but it was how the war actually operated at the tactical level. The official structure and the actual structure existed in an uneasy coexistence. Both were real. Both mattered.

 But in moments of tactical urgency, the informal structure, the liaison channels, the SAS autonomy, the rapid assessment and response was often more determinative of what actually happened than the formal request system.